Whole Dude – Whole Spirituality

The Story of America to do the Right Thing

The Architects of US-China Relations

Dr. Henry Alfred Kissinger is widely acknowledged as the architect of U.S. – China relations. He published an article titled “Avoiding a U.S. – China cold war in The Washington Post, Friday, January 14, 2011. I am totally surprised to find that he makes no mention about Tibet. He does not speak about the ideals and the values cherished by most Americans.

The fundamental values that shape American thinking are Liberty, Equality, and Justice. Americans believe in Democracy, Individual Freedoms, and Openness. The Spirit of American Freedom is clearly reflected in the United States Constitution. American people want a government that is transparent and is accountable for its actions. I call the US-China relations that commenced in March, 1972 as a historical mistake. I speak on behalf of ‘The Living Tibetan Spirits’. The United States – Tibet relations truly represent the Spirit of American Freedom and Tibet is an integral part the US-China relationship for moral, historical, and strategic reasons.

The Backstabbers and the Grave- Diggers:             

Dr. Kissinger arrived in the U.S. in 1938 to escape the Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany. President Richard M Nixon appointed him as Assistant for National Security Affairs in December 1968. While working at the National Security Council, Dr. Kissinger gathered most of the reins of U.S. foreign policy into his own hands. He totally controlled the discussion at the National Security Council. He outweighed William P Rogers, the Secretary of State in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. He negotiated with Heads of State and Prime ministers without the participation of the Secretary of State. Dr. Kissinger had conducted secret talks with foreign powers violating the democratic norms of transparency, and accountability. As the U.S. National Security Adviser, Dr. Kissinger made a secret visit to Peking (Beijing) in 1971 and met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), and Prime Minister Chou Enlai (Zhou Enlai) of the People’s Republic of China. Mao Tse-tung, and Chou Enlai are recognized as the architects of The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that began in 1966. Mao Tse-tung, and Chou Enlai are mass murderers who had unleashed a campaign of terror and violence against innocent people. It would be morally and ethically just to charge these individuals for crimes against humanity. The injury caused by this madness of Cultural Revolution was particularly severe in occupied Tibet. Thousands of innocent Tibetans had escaped into exile to save their lives. I am a witness to this Tibetan Pain and Suffering. My consciousness got exposed to the Spirits of young Tibetan men who had laid down their lives with the dreams of evicting the illegal occupier from The Land of Tibet. The brutality of Chinese Communist Rulers was duly recognized by the people of the United States and it paved the way for the US-Tibet relations. While the US-Tibet relations received the support from the U.S. Congress, it would be illegal, and immoral to destroy the established relationship without the explicit sanction of the U.S. Congress. The U.S. Constitution demands that the U.S. Administration must be fully accountable for all of its actions and the U.S. Congress acts on behalf of the people to demand that public accountability. To that extent, the actions of Dr. Kissinger in 1971 were illegal, and unconstitutional. He grossly misused his position as an adviser. He unconstitutionally assumed the powers and trust placed in the office of the Secretary of State. He abused his office to contact people who deserve to be charged for the crimes of genocide. During 1971-72, Dr. Kissinger developed a rapprochement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China by backstabbing innocent Tibetans who established a relationship with the people of the United States. I describe President Richard M Nixon, and Dr. Henry Alfred Kissinger as the ‘Grave-Diggers’. They prepared a grave to bury the US-Tibet relations to initiate a relationship with Communist China.

The Tibetan Mail Delivery Service:

During 1972 I was serving in North East Frontier Agency of India that is now known as Arunachal Pradesh. Being the birthplace of 6th Dalai Lama, this region has several Tibetan people who had moved here from Southern Tibet to live in exile after the illegal occupation of Tibet. Soon after President Richard M Nixon’s visit to Peking in February 1972, I was surprised to receive a ‘package’ sent by the U.S. Government. The ‘package’ was required to be delivered at a remote location in Southern Tibet where there was no established postal or courier mail service. I was providing humanitarian aid and medical services to the Tibetan exile community. Tibetans were upset about the prospects of U.S.-China relations that were getting forged while attempting to bury the U.S.- Tibet relations. However, they were hopeful that the U.S.-Tibet relations would eventually prevail. This ‘package’ sent by the U.S. Government during 1972 after President Nixon’s visit to Peking was one strategic reason to keep the U.S.-Tibet relations alive. The Tibetans as per the U.S. request delivered that ‘package’ at that specified location in Southern Tibet.              

The Future of the US-Tibet Relations

“THE AMERICANS ALWAYS DO THE RIGHT THINGS AFTER THEY HAVE TRIED EVERYTHING ELSE” – SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL.

Just like Sir. Winston Churchill, I firmly believe that the Americans will do the right thing. I have no doubts about the American Spirit of Freedom. Americans love the democratic way of life. Americans embrace openness. Americans expect transparency and public accountability. Americans defend Human Rights, Human Values, and the ideals of Individual Liberty. Americans have rightly understood the pain and the suffering in the Land of Tibet. The U.S. – Tibet relations will survive the test of times and there is no hope for any long-lasting relations between Democracy and Communism. By its very nature, Democracy is not compatible with Communism.

Rudra N. Rebbapragada, Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A.

Service Information:

Service Number: MS-8466/MR-03277K; Rank: Lieutenant/Captain/Major; Branch: Army Medical Corps/Short Service Regular Commission/Direct Permanent Commission (1969-1984); Unit: Headquarters Establishment Number. 22, C/O 56 APO. Designation: Medical Officer(1971-1974); Medical Officer, South Column, Operation Eagle 1971-1972; Organization: Special Frontier Force.

Avoiding a U.S.-China Cold War

By Henry A. Kissinger
the Washington Post, Friday, January 14, 2011;

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/13/AR2011011304832.html?wpisrc=nl_politics

The upcoming summit between the American and Chinese presidents is to take place while progress is being made in resolving many of the issues before them, and a positive communique is probable. Yet both leaders also face an opinion among elites in their countries emphasizing conflict rather than cooperation.

Most Chinese I encounter outside of government, and some in government, seem convinced that the United States seeks to contain China and to constrict its rise. American strategic thinkers are calling attention to China’s increasing global economic reach and the growing capability of its military forces.

Care must be taken lest both sides analyze themselves into self-fulfilling prophecies. The nature of globalization and the reach of modern technology oblige the United States and China to interact around the world. A Cold War between them would bring about an international choosing of sides, spreading disputes into internal politics of every region at a time when issues such as nuclear proliferation, the environment, energy and climate require a comprehensive global solution.

Conflict is not inherent in a nation’s rise. The United States in the 20th century is an example of a state achieving eminence without conflict with the then-dominant countries. Nor was the often-cited German-British conflict inevitable. Thoughtless and provocative policies played a role in transforming European diplomacy into a zero-sum game.

Sino-U.S. relations need not take such a turn. On most contemporary issues, the two countries cooperate adequately; what the two countries lack is an overarching concept for their interaction. During the Cold War, a common adversary supplied the bond. Common concepts have not yet emerged from the multiplicity of new tasks facing a globalized world undergoing political, economic and technological upheaval.

That is not a simple matter. For it implies subordinating national aspirations to a vision of a global order.
Neither the United States nor China has experience in such a task. Each assumes its national values to be both unique and of a kind to which other people naturally aspire. Reconciling the two versions of exceptionalism is the deepest challenge of the Sino-American relationship.

America’s exceptionalism finds it natural to condition its conduct toward other societies on their acceptance of American values. Most Chinese see their country’s rise not as a challenge to America but as heralding a return to the normal state of affairs when China was preeminent. In the Chinese view, it is the past 200 years of relative weakness – not China’s current resurgence – that represent an abnormality.

America historically has acted as if it could participate in or withdraw from international affairs at will. In the Chinese perception of itself as the Middle Kingdom, the idea of the sovereign equality of states was unknown. Until the end of the 19th century, China treated foreign countries as various categories of vassals. China never encountered a country of comparable magnitude until European armies imposed an end to its seclusion. A foreign ministry was not established until 1861, and then primarily for dealing with colonialist invaders.

America has found most problems it recognized as soluble. China, in its history of millennia, came to believe that few problems have ultimate solutions. America has a problem-solving approach; China is comfortable managing contradictions without assuming they are resolvable.

American diplomacy pursues specific outcomes with single-minded determination. Chinese negotiators are more likely to view the process as combining political, economic and strategic elements and to seek outcomes via an extended process. American negotiators become restless and impatient with deadlocks; Chinese negotiators consider them the inevitable mechanism of negotiation. American negotiators represent a society that has never suffered national catastrophe – except the Civil War, which is not viewed as an international experience. Chinese negotiators cannot forget the century of humiliation when foreign armies exacted tribute from a prostrate China. Chinese leaders are extremely sensitive to the slightest implication of condescension and are apt to translate American insistence as lack of respect.

North Korea provides a good example of differences in perspective. America is focused on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. China, which in the long run has more to fear from nuclear weapons there than we, in addition emphasizes propinquity. It is concerned about the turmoil that might follow if pressures on nonproliferation lead to the disintegration of the North Korean regime. America seeks a concrete solution to a specific problem. China views any such outcome as a midpoint in a series of interrelated challenges, with no finite end, about the future of Northeast Asia. For real progress, diplomacy with Korea needs a broader base.

Americans frequently appeal to China to prove its sense of “international responsibility” by contributing to the solution of a particular problem. The proposition that China must prove its bona fides is grating to a country that regards itself as adjusting to membership in an international system designed in its absence on the basis of programs it did not participate in developing.

While America pursues pragmatic policies, China tends to view these policies as part of a general design. Indeed, it tends to find a rationale for essentially domestically driven initiatives in terms of an overall strategy to hold China down.

The test of world order is the extent to which the contending can reassure each other. In the American-Chinese relationship, the overriding reality is that neither country will ever be able to dominate the other and that conflict between them would exhaust their societies. Can they find a conceptual framework to express this reality? A concept of a Pacific community could become an organizing principle of the 21st century to avoid the formation of blocs. For this, they need a consultative mechanism that permits the elaboration of common long-term objectives and coordinates the positions of the two countries at international conferences.

The aim should be to create a tradition of respect and cooperation so that the successors of leaders meeting now continue to see it in their interest to build an emerging world order as a joint enterprise.

The writer was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977.

Soon after President Richard M Nixon’s historical visit to Communist China, I was rather surprised in 1972, when I received a ‘package’ sent by the U.S. Government. This ‘package’ was required to be delivered at a remote location in Southern Tibet where there was no mail or courier service. I was living with the Tibetan exile community to provide them humanitarian aid and medical services. In spite of the pain caused by Dr. Kissinger’s actions, the Tibetans remained very hopeful of the U.S. – Tibet relations. Many of the Tibetans in my camp belonged to Southern Tibet and know that remote region very well. As per the U.S. request, the ‘package’ that I received was delivered by my Tibetan Comrades at the address specified.